Battles of the Nineteenth Century, Page 110.
The Bombardment Of Matanzas
Matanzas is the second city of Cuba, coming next to Havana both
in population and in wealth. It is a city of more than 50,000
inhabitants, with well built streets, and in the suburbs the broad
promenades are overhung with shade trees. Which the colonial Spaniard
loves. Several railways
connect it with the capital and with the towns of what was lately the
richest district in Cuba, a land of rich soil with tobacco and sugar
plantations, well watered by the numerous rivers, each with its course
marked by long winding avenues of “royal palms,” the noblest of West
Indian trees.
The city stands at the end of a deep curving bay.
A reef of rocks forms a breakwater in front of its wharves, and
the passage into this inner harbour at each end of the reef is guarded
by an old Spanish fort. In
the days of short-range artillery these were the only defences of
Matanzas. But modern
batteries, armed with heavy rifled guns, had been erected, both on the
slopes of the wooded promontories that guarded the mouth of the bay, and
on the edge of the sea below. Morillo
Battery, looking out between the headlands, crossed its fire with Maya
on the right and Fort Rubal Caya on the left.
Further in than Rubal Caya, a sandbag battery was being erected
on the low ground of Punta Gorda. The
great depth of water at the entrance more than a hundred and fifty
fathoms-made defence by submarine mines extremely difficult.
If Matanzas Bay was to be held, it must be by the batteries,
assisted by torpedo boats. There
was a suspicion that the United States staff might select the bay as a
convenient place for landing their army for the advance of Havana, so a
considerable force of Spanish troops had been concentrated at Matanzas
city to resist a possible attempt at invasion.
Since the second day of the war, the cruiser Cincinnati and the
powerful turret ship Puritan had been watching the place.
From their position a few miles off the land they could see every
day strong working parties on the headlands extending the earthworks and
mounting new guns. A
torpedo boat, which ran into take a closer look at the shore, was fired
on from Point Maya, and Admiral Sampson, on hearing the report of this
occurrence, decided to reconnoitre with a more powerful force.
Accordingly, on the morning of Wednesday April 27th,
he left the blockading squadron before Havana, and with his flagship the
New York steamed eastward along the coast to join the Puritan and
Cincinnati before Matanzas.
It was a bright clear day, with a smooth sea and hardly any wind,
an ideal day for naval gunners to make good practice.
The New York led the way towards Matanzas harbour mouth, the
Puritan following her, and the Cincinnati remaining further out to
seaward. The New York and the Puritan alone were a formidable force:
the great armoured cruiser with her two masts fitted with several
fighting tops, her three funnels, her many quick firers, and the six
long 8-inch guns mounted in armoured barbettes; the monitor, a heavy low
lying craft, her deck almost level with the water, and her two pairs of
12-inch guns mounted in revolving turrets.
As they headed for the bay, work ceased in the batteries.
Spade and pick were laid aside, and the Spanish gunners stood by
their pieces, waiting to open fire.
A few minutes before one o’clock the first shot was fired, it
came from the batteries on Point Maya.
There was a bright flash, a cloud of blue smoke above the low
breastwork on the shore, and a moment after a tall fountain of water
spurting from the sea half a mile from the New York showed that the
shell had fallen short. The
Spaniards had judged the distance badly.
The flagship was at the moment about 6,000 yards from the
battery, and ought to have been fairly easy target, even though she was
under way. Still moving
towards the bay, the Admiral signalled to the Puritan, which was nearer
Maya, to reply, and the monitor answered with her quick firers, the
first few shots falling short. Presently
she got the range, and then she brought her big turret guns into action.
Two of the enormous shells, each a thousand pounds in weight,
fell close to the breastwork of the battery and exploded in a cloud of
flying sand and earth. But
a naval officer who stood on the bridge of the New York beside the
Admiral, and watched, with a powerful telescope, the bursting shells,
noted that none of them had done any serious damage to the battery, and
the gunners at Maya kept up a steady fire all the time.
None of their shells actually hit the Puritan, but all round her
the flying jets of water showed that they were not far from their mark.
And now the batteries on the opposite point joined in the
engagement. A shot from
Rubal Caya struck the water just a hundred yards ahead of the New York,
another from Punta Gordz flew high over her deck.
Lying broadside on to the batteries, the New York replied with
five of her 8-inch guns, two from each barbette and one from the
starboard sponson amidships. All
her smaller guns on that side joined in, and a signal to the Cincinnati
called the cruiser up to lie to the westward of the flagship and assist
her in hammering away at the batteries on Sabanilla Point, the Puritan
devoting all her attention to those on Maya.
For a few minutes the fire from the three American ships was very
heavy. Wrapped in clouds of
smoke, they were steaming nearer and nearer the batteries till the range
was reduced to about 3,000 yards, a short distance for such powerful
guns as were now in action. The
Spanish gunners were firing slowly and deliberately, but not one shot
from the batteries actually hit the ships, though several fell close to
them, or flew screaming high in air above the funnels and between their
masts. The lookouts in the
tops of the ships could see that on the other hand the American fire was
well directed. Shell after
shell burst in the earthworks, and the flying showers of debris showed
that the explosions were rapidly destroying the Spanish defences.
The first shot had been fired from Maya at three minutes to one,
at a quarter past the hour the batteries on both points were silent, and
Sampson signalled to cease-fire and resume station off the port.
As the ships turned slowly with silent, smoking guns, Rubal Caya
fired a last shot, which fell between the Puritan and the New York.
The monitor replied with a 12-inch shell from her stern turret.
It struck the battery and sent up a shower of rubbish sixty feet
into the air. To those who
watched the shot from the bridge of the flagship, it seemed that a gun
had been dismounted and all the gunners killed.
The first report of the Matanzas bombardment from Spanish sources
admitted that a good deal of damage had been done to the batteries, and
that several men had been killed. It
was also stated that some projectiles had fallen into the city; these
must have been shells intended for Punta Gorda, but aimed far too high.
A subsequent report said that little or no injury had been done
to the works; and as for losses, the only casualty was the death of a
mule, unfortunately hit by a shot in the rear of one of the batteries.
This story of the “sad death of a mule at Matanzas” was
probably not meant to be taken seriously.
It was playful satire on the wildly exaggerated accounts of the
bombardment circulated by the more sensational newspapers in the United
States. Some of these were
the work of pure imagination. It
so happened that only one of the numerous “press boats” was with the
squadron when Matanzas was attacked.
All the rest were off Havana, for Admiral Sampson had given no
hint of his intentions. But
the boat belonging to the New York Herald followed the flagship; its
correspondents were the fight. Then
the little steamer ran back to Key West through some very rough weather,
for in the evening there was a sudden gale.
Soon after midnight the news was on the wires for New York.
The Herald had next day the satisfaction of publishing the only
complete ad authentic narrative of the affair.
Some of its rivals had, it is true, wonderful stories of the
bombardment; but they were highly coloured romances based on a small
foundation of fact gleaned from telegraph operators, who could not help
talking about the great news from Cuba.
According to these stories the Spanish batteries had been laid in
ruins, hundreds of the enemy’s gunners had been blown to atoms; the
crews of the warships had displayed the wildest enthusiasm, the men
cheering every shot, and the stokers down below running up to request
permission to have a shot at Spaniards.
If these absurd newspaper touches had been true, it would not say
much for the discipline of the American navy.
In one paper an imaginative writer told how after each shot one
could hear the rumbling fall of the earth displaced from the enemy’s
breastworks. Anyone who
could hear this at a range of from two to four miles must have good
ears.
The plain facts were set forth in Admiral Sampson’s brief
official report next day. He
had exchanged fire with the batteries at the entrance to Matanzas Bay,
in order to ascertain the strength and position of the works, to get
some idea of their armament, and to prevent the completion of the new
battery at Punta Gorda. He
had silenced the outlying batteries, and was well satisfied with the
conduct of his crews.
The bombardment showed that the gun practice of the United States
ships was excellent, that of the Spanish artillerymen hopelessly bad.
But only a few days after, the Americans suffered severe loss
through presuming that all Spanish gunners would shoot as wildly as
those at Matanzas. As to
the damage done, the inner forts were, of course, intact. They had not even been in action. The damage done to the earthwork batteries at the harbour
mouth was probably of a kind that could be easily made good.
Only about sixty heavy shells had been fired from the fleet, the
Spaniards replying with about half that number.
Our own experience at Alexandria showed that a much heavier and
more prolonged bombardment does not suffice to demolish beyond repair
even badly constructed batteries. The results of the practice cannot be judged from the ships,
unless large allowance is made for misleading impressions.
Thus a shell bursting a few feet in front of the parapet of a
battery will send up a tremendous cloud of dust and sand, and an
onlooker from the ship will think he has seen a lot of the breastwork
itself blown into the air, though actually it has not been touched.
Again, even when the shell bursts fairly on the breastwork, the
earth it displaces mostly falls back into very nearly its original
position. In experiments at
Lydd against earthwork batteries, it has been found that the only result
of a prolonged bombardment is to reduce to a moderate extent the height
of the crest of the parapet, and to bring down the general level of its
outer slope. The fact that
as the American ships were with drawing a last shot was fired from Rubal
Caya shows that the batteries were not demolished.
Apparently the chief damage done was to the unfinished work at
Punta Gorda, on which the New York directed a hot fire, the destruction
of this battery being the object that Sampson had chiefly in view.
Altogether, the attack on the Matanzas batteries, though not an
important affair, was very encouraging to the United States.
It was a welcome change from the captures of tramp steamers and
coasting schooners that had so far been the only exploits of Sampson’s
fleet, and it helped to calm the impatience of American public opinion,
which from the first day of the war had been eagerly anticipating a
fight. A few days more
brought news of a more serious naval engagement, not in Cuban waters
this time, but in the far off Philippines.
These islands had for a long time been the scene of
insurrectionary movements against Spain, and the united States Pacific
squadron, under Commodore Dewey, had been concentrated at Hong Kong
before the war, with orders to proceed to Manila, destroy the Spanish
Pacific fleet, and co-operate with the rebels as soon as war was
declared.
It was a momentous resolution, which had more of a political than
a military bearing on the results of the war.
For the small force was not helpless to influence the general
results of the conflict, nor did the American attack on Manila lead to
any Spanish force being diverted in that direction during the decisive
period of the struggle. On
the other hand, however opposed many of the leading men in the United
States might be to making war undertaken for the liberation of Cuba the
occasion of a campaign of conquest in Eastern seas, there was little
doubt that once the Stars and Stripes were hoisted in the Philippines
they would not be hauled down again. Thus the order that told Commodore Dewey to set out for
Manila did more than set a squadron in motion.
It launched the united States on a new policy of imperial rule.