The war between Japan and Russia, which began in February 1904,
was preceded by along period of growing diplomatic tension.
In 1902the Japanese Government had secured a defensive alliance
with the British Empire by a treaty which in its third article laid down
that if any other state should join in hostilities against one of the
allies, while engaged in war, the second contracting Power would come to
the assistance of that ally and conduct war and make peace in common.
This treaty protected Japan against any such combination as that
of Germany, Russia and France, which had in 1895 deprived her of Port
Arthur and Wei-hai-wei. But
it is a complete delusion to suppose that she was eager for war with
Russia. On the contrary her
Government sedulously strove to reach a friendly settlement with that
Power, and was supported in its efforts by British diplomacy.
The Russian occupation of Manchuria had alarmed Japan and caused
disquiet in England. If
Russia advanced-as she seemed to intend-and gradually occupied Korea,
then the danger to Japan would become extreme.
A glance at the map will show that a powerful Russian Fleet,
based on the magnificent harbours in southern Korea, and in direct
communication with European Russia by the Siberian railway, which was
opened to Port Arthur in 1903 and could easily be extended through
Korea, would dominate the Sea of Japan and threaten Japanese territory
and independence. Port
Arthur had passed into Russian hands in 1897 and had been strongly
fortified, though if had not been adequate developed as a naval base. Vladistock had been Russian for nearly half a century and was
fairly equipped as a naval base and connected with the Siberian railway.
Russian control of Korea would plant a first class naval and
military Power in a position of overwhelming strength in the Far East,
whence it could strike at the very heart of Japan.
Just as England had always made it a vital aim in foreign policy
to prevent the subjection of Holland and Belgium by any great European
Power, so it was a vital aim of Japanese policy to prevent Russian
dominance in Korea.
If there was to be a struggle between Japan and Russia before
Korea was annexed and absorbed in the Russian Empire, sea power must
obviously play a determining part.
Without control of sea communication, it would be impossible for
Japan to operate on land, and operate on land she must if she was to
prevent the Russians from over running Korea.
She must therefore have a naval force sufficiently strong to
defeat or contain the Russian naval force in the Far East.
But this was not all; she must also have land forces to defeat or
hold off from Korea the Russian land forces, which could be steadily
increased as the Siberian railway brought up reserves from Europe.
The capacity of that line, however, was at the date strictly
limited; it had only a single pair of rails and there was a break in it
at Lake Baikal, across which trains in summer were conveyed in a train
ferry. In winter, troops or
passengers had to detrain and cross the ice in sledges.
The distances were immense-about 5,000 miles from Moscow to Port
Arthur-and much of the country through which the railway passed was
desolate or unsettled. Most
of the supplies for the Russian army had therefore to be drawn from
European Russia, though Manchuria was a rich province and produced a
good deal of corn.
Japan’s task before entering upon so terrific a struggle with
so formidable an antagonist was to maintain the correct balance between
her navy and army, so as to avoid any dissipation of force.
An insufficient navy would paralyse her army; an insufficient
army would render naval success fruitless.
The problem was one of extreme perplexity for her government and
people, for at this date she was a poor country with strictly limited
resources, and the manner in which it was solved reflects the highest
credit upon her statesmanship.
A competition of naval armaments preceded this conflict as it
preceded the Great War, ten years later.
But for some reason, probably muddle headedness, the Russian
Government failed to show the concentration of purpose and the power of
hard and correct thinking, which marked Japan.
In 1902, Japan for the time being held a distinct superiority at
sea with six good battleships and six good armoured cruisers.
Had she struck then, the Russians at sea could have offered only
a weak resistance. Subsequently,
the Russian Government hurried ships to the Far East as fast as they
were completed, but it failed to expand its dockyards on the Pacific and
to press forward its programmes with the energy required, if it meant to
challenge war with the Japanese. For
example, the battleships BORODINO, OREL and ALEXANDER III, which were
launched in 1901-2, might with vigour in the administration have been
ready by the close of 1903. At that date England was completing battleships in two years
from the date of lying down.
In Russia, there was a dissipation of effort instead of a
resolute concentration on the vital object.
Though the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea would in war be
confined to that sea unless danger of war with European Powers was to be
accepted, that fleet was strengthened between 1890 and 1900 with ships,
which, with greater foresight, would have been built in the Baltic.
The money spent on them was wasted so far as concerned a war with
Japan.
Moreover, while Japan maintained a distinct homogeneity in her
armoured ships so that they were designed to act together, the Russian
Navy was too much a collection of specimens.
Its units were generally formidable and they stood up well to
severe punishment, but they were of such varied types, sizes, coal
endurance, speed and armament as seriously to interfere with their
employment in large squadrons. Several small coast defence vessels were built for Baltic
operations and absorbed money and energy that would have been better
devoted to powerful sea going ships.
The armoured cruisers in the Russian Navy were as curiously
uneven as the battleships. Side
by side with such as the RURIK, ROSSIA and GROMOBOI, was the much
smaller BAYAN.
As the risk of war increased, all available Russian armoured
ships were not concentrated in the Far East, as they might have been.
Such vessels as the SISSOI VELIKY, NAVARIN, NICHOLAS ALEXANDER
II, and I were left in the Baltic. Three of them had been in the Far East and were sent back to
Kronstadt to be refitted when the work ought to have been done at Port
Arthur or Vladistock. Though
they were of the second class, their presence in the Far East at the
outbreak of war would have added greatly to Japan’s difficulties.
Doubtless one of the reasons, which prevented the Russian
Government from despatching these ships to the Far East was the
insufficient accommodation at Port Arthur, but that was a handicap which
could easily have been overcome by developing Dalny.
The following brief statement shows the movement of Russian ships
to the Far East in 1903. There
arrived at Port Arthur:
In March: fast cruisers ASKOLD and VARIAG.
In May: battleship RETVISAN; cruisers NOVIK, DIANA,
PALLADA.
In June: cruisers BOYARIN, BOGATYR, with seven
destroyers.
In July: battleship POBIEDA.
In December: battleship TZESAREVITCH, armoured
cruiser BAYAN, seven destroyers.
There were also under orders for the Far East in December the
battleships OSLIABIA and NICHOLAS I; the protected cruisers AURORA and
ALMAZ; the old armoured cruiser DMITRI DONSKOI; and seven destroyers,
all of which at the end of 1903 were in Mediterranean.
In early December 1903, the Russian Government attempted to buy
the two new powerful Chilean battleships, constitution and Liberated
which were just approaching completion in England and were on the
market. The British
Government, however, fearing a disturbance of the balance of naval
power, stepped in and secured them for the British Navy where they were
renamed the Triumph and Swiftsure.
Meantime, deeply concerned at the growing strength of the Russian
Fleet, the Japanese Government purchased from the Argentine two good
armoured cruisers, the Moreno and Rivadavia, which were building in
Italy and were almost complete. They
were renamed Nisshin and Kasuga, and were similar in design to that
excellent ship, the Colon, which had fought in Cervera’s luckless
squadron at Santiago, though they were more modern and equipped with
guns of extreme range and power for their size.
Not till January 8th 1904, were they able to leave
Genoa in charge of two British reserve officers.
At that date Japan did not build armoured vessels and was
entirely dependent on foreign yards for them.
She was, however, preparing to construct them, and had already
established big gun and armour plants, which were of the utmost service
in the war, though in 1904 their capacity of output was only small.
In January 1905, she laid down the first large armoured ship to
be built in a Japanese yard, the Tsukuba and at the close of the war she
had four large armoured ships at home on the stocks and two more
approaching completion in England.
But for the immediate necessities of a war with Russia there was
nothing whatever behind the Japanese Fleet as it stood on January 1st
1904. Behind the Russian
Fleet on the other hand were numerous new and powerful vessels
completing which might sooner or later be expected to join the Russian
force in the Far East, and did actually go east, though not until it was
too late. Times were
therefore a consideration of the first importance in the Japanese
operations.
The Russian Staff had discussed plans long before the war and had
arrived at thoroughly unsound decisions.
In 1901 a naval committee examined the strategic problem and
concluded that the task of the Russian Fleet would be to secure command
of the Yellow Sea and South Korean waters,” when the Japanese would be
unable to disembark troops anywhere.
The committee determined to divide the Russian fleet between Port
Arthur and Vladivostock. The main body was to be stationed at Port Arthur “to
command the Yellow Sea”; a detachment was to be sent to Vladivostock
to attack Japanese communications and raid the Japanese coast.
There was no idea of concentrating every effective ship for an
immediate battle but on the contrary, the scheme involved a dangerous
dispersion of force, which would favour the plans of a resolute
antagonist, who was fighting for life.
The defeat and destruction of the Japanese Fleet was hardly
considered and the main Russian Fleet was apparently to act passively
and wait to be attacked. Possibly this plan was inspired by the theory
of the “fleet in being” current about that period in England, under
which it was assumed that so long as a powerful fleet was in existence,
any movement of troops overseas was impossible, or certain to lead to
disaster. Events were very
speedily to prove this singular doctrine an error of the worst and most
mischievous kind. In 1902
the Russian plans were once more scrutinised and maintained intact.
In October 1903, when war had drawn perceptibly nearer, Major
General Flug, military adviser of the Russian Viceroy, Vice Admiral
Alexeieff, was asked by the Russian General Staff yet again to examine
the proposed strategy and dispositions of the Russian Fleet in view of
the fact that the plan of campaign on land would be largely dependent on
operations at sea. He
consulted Rear Admiral Vitgeft, Chief of the Russian Naval Staff in the
Far East, and was informed by him that “our fleet cannot be beaten by
the Japanese Fleet, whether in the Gulf of Korea or in the Yellow
Sea”; and that, therefore a landing by the Japanese in the Gulf of
Korea or at Newchwang was “absolutely impossible.”
This conclusion of Vitgeft’s with its ill-founded confidence
was made the basis of all the Russian plans.
It was accompanied by a second and not less disastrous
misjudgement of Japan’s military strength.
The Russian War Minister Kuropatkin, states that the Russian
calculated Japan’s whole available force for land operations at only a
little over 400,000 men, which would give no more than 200,000 men in
the field. The force
actually called up by Japan was 1,542,000 men, nearly four times what
the Russian experts estimated. Miscalculations
of this kind are deadly in war. It
was upon such worthless assurances that the Russian Government relied
when it rejected Japan’s proposal for a Japanese protectorate in
Korea, in exchange for which the Japanese Government was prepared to
recognise Russians special interests in Manchuria.
The British Government warned the Czar privately, through France,
that Japans forces by land and sea were efficient and powerful, but the
warning was disregarded as an attempt to assist Japan by “bluff”. Kuropatkin was strongly against a war in the Far East,
believing it contrary to Russia’s true interests; only unfortunately
no one listened to him. He
complained justly that instead of developing and strongly fortifying the
naval bases of Port Arthur and Vladivostock, the Russian railway
administration created at great cost an undefended port at Dalny, and
thus eventually presented the Japanese with a magnificent ready-made
base.
On January 12th 1904 the Russian Government ordered
Alexeieff to prepare for mobilisation and to put Port Arthur and
Vladivostock in a state of defence.
But on January 28th he was instructed not to oppose a
Japanese landing in Korea, provided it was not affected north of
Chemulpo. The object of
this order was not so much to avoid as merely postponing a collision and
gaining time for the Russian mobilisation.
On February 3rd the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur
assembled outside that base, apparently ready for operations. This news reached Japan, where it caused great disquietude,
and on the 4th, after a prolonged sitting, a council if
ministers, “Elder Statesmen,” and naval and military commanders
decided to break off diplomatic relations on February 6th,
and to put the Japanese Fleet in motion, if Russia did not previously
accept the Japanese proposals. The
Nisshin and Kasuga, then at Singapore, were ordered without fail to
leave that port on the 6th.
They arrived safely at Yokosuka on February 16th.
So far back as October 1903, Vice admiral Togo had been appointed
to command the main Japanese Fleet.
He was fifty-seven years of age and in the war with China had
distinguished himself, displaying energy and quickness of decision, as
captain of the Naniwa. In
his youth he had studied his profession in England and had undergone a
period of training in the Worcester.
He was a most capable leader, served by an excellent staff, and
at the date of his appointment he enjoyed special prestige in the
Japanese Navy from the high professional qualities, which he had shown
in command of the Japanese Permanent Squadron during the Boxer Campaign.
In selecting him his government proved itself a remarkable judge
of character. He was not a
man who would ever blow his own trumpet; his modesty was as striking as
his courage and determination; his judgement was rarely at fault.
The Japanese Fleet under his orders was constantly exercised and
kept in thorough readiness for war; as he had in January and February
1904, to be ready to cover the Nisshin and Kasuga, should the Russian
Fleet in the Far East detach any of its ships to seize them.
He had with him the following force:
First Squadron
Battleships,
1st Division
Mikasa
(flag), Asahi, Fuji, Yashima, Shikishima, Hatsuse (flag of Rear-Admiral
Nashiba).
Cruisers,
3rd Division
Chitose
(Rear-Admiral Dewa), Takasago, Kasagi, Yoshino
Despatch Boat
Tatsuta
Destroyers and Torpedo Boats
1st
Division, Shirakumo, Asashiho, Kasumi, Akatsuki
2nd
Division, Ikadzuchi, Oboro, Inadzuma, Akebono
3rd
Division, Usugomo, Shinonome, Sazanami
1st
T.B Division, Nos. 69, 67, 68, 70
14th
T.B. Division, Chidori, Hayabusa, Manadzuru, Kasasagi.
Armoured
Cruisers
2nd
Division
Idzumo (Vice admiral Kamimura),
Adzuma, Asama, Yakumo, Tokiwa, Iwate (flag or Rear admiral Mizu)
Cruisers
4th
Division
Naniwa (Rear-Admiral Uriu), Akashi,
Takachiho, Niitaka.
Despatch Boat
Chihaya
Destroyers and Torpedo Boats
4th
Division, Hayatori, Asagiri, Harusame, Murasame
5th
Division, Murakumo, Shiranui, Yugiri, Kagero
9th
T.B. Division, Aotaka, Hato, Kari, Tsubame
20th
T.B. Division, Nos 62, 63, 64, 65.
Besides these ships there was an independent third Squadron of
old vessels under Vice Admiral Kataoka and an Auxiliary Squadron of
armed merchant steamers, colliers, gunboats, mine layers, mine sweepers,
repair ships and torpedo depot ships.
The fleet was a most formidable force, manned by thoroughly good
seamen and commanded by skilled and determined officers, who ten years
earlier had had much experience of naval war in the conflict with China.
There were in Japan eleven large docks, capable of accommodating
battleships or armoured cruisers, and besides large initial reserves of
Welsh coal, there was an abundant supply of Japanese fuel, though this
was of inferior quality.
The six battleships were typical vessels of that date, each
mounting four 12-inch guns for and aft in two barbettes with strong
hoods, and from ten to fourteen 6-inch guns behind armour.
They were protected on the waterline by thick steel belts with
thinner plating above to some height above the water.
They were well equipped in every respect and provided with good
wireless installations, for at this date wireless had proved its
invaluable qualities and was constantly used by the Japanese and in a
less degree by the Russians. The six armoured cruisers in Kamimura’s squadron were built
in response to the fashion of that time; they were much more than a
match for protected cruiser but were weak both in armour and gun power
for encounter with battleships. Each
carried four 8-inch guns (250-pound shell) mounted in two barbettes fore
and aft, with twelve to fourteen 6-inch guns also behind armour.
On the waterline they had belts of thin armour.
They had trial speeds of 20 to 23 knots and in service could make
18 knots or more.
Of the protected cruisers the Takasago, Chitose and Kasagi
mounted each two 8-inch guns (one fore and one aft) and ten 4.7-inch
quick firers; the Yashino has already been described as she took part in
the war with China, and though a comparatively old ship she was
thoroughly efficient in 1904. The
destroyers were new boats of British design, many of them built in
England; they displaced 275 to 375 tons, steamed 30 to 31 knots, and
carried, besides one 12-pounder (increased later in 1904 to two
12-pounders in view of war needs) and five 6-pounders apiece, two
torpedo tubes, discharging 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes with 171 to 200
pounds of explosive in them, of which four were carried.
The torpedo boats used the smaller 14-inch torpedo with a charge
of 79 pounds. The extreme
range of the latest torpedoes used in 1904 was about 3,000 yards.
All the large Japanese ships carried heavy torpedo armaments,
which were of little service in the war, and never affected a hit.
The weight devoted to them would be better have been given to
guns and ammunition, in the light of subsequent events.
Japanese opinion afterwards held that a mistake had been made in
not building fast battleships in place of the armoured cruisers.
Four fast ships of the type laid down in the war in the Tsukuba
(20 ½ knots, four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch guns) would have been more
valuable in the actual conditions of the conflict than the six vessels
of the Asama type and would have cost no more.
But that, perhaps, could not be foreseen.
The Japanese ships had a high degree of uniformity and they
represented the best technical judgment of the time.
The absence of submarines will be noted.
They were then in the experimental stage, and there were no
aircraft. This was the last
Great War in two dimensions at sea and it marks the end of an age of
naval development.
Nature had given Japan one signal advantage, the islands of her
empire for more than 2,000 miles from the eastern coast of Asia in an
almost unbroken chain, from the south of Formosa to the north of the
Kuriles, providing her navy with a series of bases connected by
telegraph. Along this chain
of positions any enemy approaching from Europe would have to pass with
the Japanese Navy on its flank. A Japanese fleet stationed in the Straits of Korea was able
by steaming through the Inland Sea of Japan, the entrances to which were
defended, to attack a hostile fleet moving up the western or Pacific
coast of the Japanese main group. The
Japanese Navy had one further advantage over the Russian in that it had
behind it a considerable merchant fleet, and foundries and works capable
of executing any repairs necessary with great speed.
The Japanese plans provided for the movement of the main fleet to
Port Arthur, to seek out the Russian fleet and give battle to it.
The advance of the fleet was to be preceded by the destroyers,
which were to deliver a torpedo attack, if one were practicable.
To seize the Korean capital of Seoul, four battalions of infantry
were ordered to embark at Sasebo without mobilising; they went onboard
three transports, which were ready for them on February 6th.
Thus the intention of the Japanese was to take the offensive at
the very outset with the maximum of force available and with the utmost
vigour. They did not make
the mistake of dividing their forces for the initial blow.
Practically the whole modern fleet of Japan was to participate in
it-Kamimura’s squadron as well as Togo’s.
The Japanese Staff believed in the excellent French maxim: “No
one has ever been defeated because he was too strong.”
It took immense pains to be superior at the two points where
fighting was to be expected, and it disregarded the powerful Russian
squadron at Vladivostock. Its
alertness is specially to be noted.
Not a moment was to be wasted.
The Russian force under the plan of campaign, which Admiral
Vitgeft regarded with such complacency, was scattered and divided.
The main force was at Port Arthur and was lying outside the
harbour after having made a short cruise in the Gulf of Korea.
The fast cruiser VARIAG (launched 1899, 6,500 tons, twelve 6-inch
and twelve 12-pounders quick firers) and the sloop KORIETZ (launched
1886, 1,200 tons, two 8-inch and one 6-inch old type guns) were at
Chemulpo in Korea. The
object in keeping them there, close to Seoul, the Korean capital, was to
influence the Korean Government against Japan.
Four of the best cruisers, including three large armoured
cruisers and seventeen torpedo boats, were at Vladivostock.
Between this detached squadron and the main Russian fleet at Port
Arthur lay the Japanese Fleet, holding the interior lines and able to
move against either of the two Russian forces as it chose.
No effort had been made by the Russian Government to put the
ablest naval officer it possessed in command of its fleet in the Far
East, though so much in war depends on personality.
It had a capable and energetic officer in Vice Admiral Makaroff,
aged fifty-six, who was left to cool his heels in Russia as Port Admiral
at Kronstadt. The Commander
of the main fleet was Vice-Admiral stark, aged fifty-eight, one of the
amiable, inert, routine dominated officers who so often come to the
front in peace and are beloved by Admiralties because they never disturb
people about them or above them. He
was known in his service as a good seaman.
Though seamanship is important, it is not everything in naval
war, and there were critics a century and a quarter ago who declared
that Nelson did not possess it.
In a semi-independent position 1,100 miles away at Vladivostock
with the ships there was Rear Admiral Baron Stakelberg.
Stark’s second in command in the Port Arthur fleet was
Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky, who was regarded in his own service as a
good second-rate officer. In
supreme command of both the Russian Navy and Army in the Far East was
Admiral Alexeieff, the Viceroy, aged sixty-one, who had spent his life
in the Russian Navy, but at the critical moment was inert and negligent
of the duties of the higher command.
The organisation of the Russian fleet was as follows:
Port Arthur : Vice-Admiral
Stark, Commander in Chief.
Battleships
Petropavlosk (flag), Tzesarevitch,
Retvisan, Sevastopol, Peresviet, (flag of Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky),
Pobieda, Poltava.
Cruiser Division
Askold (flag of Rear Admiral
Reitzenstein), Bayan, Diana, Pallada, Boyarin, Novik.
Torpedo Gunboats
Vsadnik, Gaidamak
Destroyers
Bditelny, Bezposchadny, Bezshumny,
Bezstrashny, Boevoi, Boiky, Burny, Grozovoi, Lieut, Burakoff, Rastoropny,
Raz iashchy, Rieshitelny, Serdity, Silny, Skory, Smyely, Statny,
Steregushchy, Storojevoi, Strashny, Stroiny, Vlastny, Vnimatelny,
Vnushitelny, Vynoslivy
Mine Layers
Amur, Yenisei
Vladivostock: Rear-Admiral
Baron Stakelberg
Armoured Cruisers
Gromoboi
(flag), Rossia, Rurik
Protected
Cruisers
Bogatyr
Both at Vladivostock and at Port Arthur there were various older
ships of small size that were constantly used for inshore duties.
At Port Arthur was only a single dock with 32 feet of water on
the sill, too short for the largest Russian battleships and armoured
cruisers; and at Vladivostock another and longer dock, which would
accommodate them. Of coal
the Russians had considerable supplies at these two bases and they could
also draw a fuel of a somewhat inferior quality from the Yentai mines,
which were in railway communication with Port Arthur.
The Russian battleships were generally contemporary in date with
their Japanese opposite numbers. The
first four and the last carried each four 12-inch guns mounted in pairs
in turrets fore and aft with twelve 6-inch quick firers, all behind fair
armour and on the waterline they had steel armour belts.
Their speed in service was 14 to 15 knots. The PERESVIET and POBIEDA had less protection and lighter
armaments-10-inch guns in place of the 12-inch guns, and eleven 6-inch
quick firing guns in place of twelve of that calibre. The Russian ships were not like the Spanish ships in the war
of 1898 or the Chinese ships in the war of 1894-5, markedly inferior to
their antagonists, though the Japanese had the better types.
The only armoured cruiser at Port Arthur was the BAYAN, which was
distinctly inferior in gunpowder to the Japanese Asama class.
The protected cruisers were good vessels of their kind; and the
destroyers were modern, if weaker in gun armament than the Japanese
vessels of their class, and of much the same size.
They had trial speeds of 26 or 27 knots.
The big armoured cruisers at Vladivostock, with the exception of
the GROMOBOI, lacked protection for their guns, which were so badly
mounted that their broadsides were markedly inferior to those of the
smaller Japanese armoured cruisers.
Each of them carried four 8-inch and sixteen 6-inch quick firers
with a broadside of two 8-inch and six to eight 6-inch.
The BOGATYR was an exceptionally good and fast protected cruiser,
able to steam 22 or 23 knots with a broadside of eight 6-inch quick
firers guns. The total of Russian armoured ships of modern type was eleven
against the Japanese fourteen (including the Nisshin and Kasuga).
The total broadside of the two armoured fleets, if concentrated,
was: Russians, twenty 12-inch; eight 10-inch; ten 8-inch, sixty-five
6-inch; and Japanese, twenty-four 12-inch, one 10-inch, thirty 8-inch,
ninety-two 6-inch. The
Japanese had thus an advantage in the number of armoured ships and a
marked advantage in weight of broadside (with common shell about 37,600
pounds for the Japanese against 26,500 pounds for the Russians). The advantage was increased by the Japanese use of high
explosive in their heavy projectiles; thus the Russians entirely lacked
and the powder bursting charges of their shells were small.
The choice of Port Arthur as the Russian point of concentration
was a mistake, because of the difficult hydrographical conditions. There is only one exit and that a narrow one; the harbour
itself is much too small for a considerable fleet; moreover if the
Japanese did achieve what Vitgeft had declared “impossible,” and did
defeat the Russian fleet, they could without any immoderate difficulty
cut Port Arthur off, with the help of a land expedition.
At Vladivostock the Russian Fleet would have had at its disposal
an immense harbour from which there are several exits; and though that
base was situated on a long peninsula, a fleet there was not so much
exposed to the risk of being cut off by land attack, because of the
bleak, rugged and difficult character of the coast in the neighbourhood.
No doubt its operations would sooner or latter have
been controlled by the Japanese Fleet operating in the Japan Sea; but
they would not have been so easily controlled as when Port Arthur was
made the principal Russian base. Indeed
the Japanese Navy Department stated during the war that in its view
“naval operations (by the Japanese fleet) off Vladivostock were
practically impossible.” On
the other hand, fogs would hamper a fleet at Vladivostock and ice and it
could not have prevented the Japanese from landing in the Gulf of Korea. The Japanese would have found it hard to blockade
Vladivostock-and Togo’s chief fear was always that the Port Arthur
fleet would escape thither-but they could have kept their main fleet
ready in the Straits of Korea, and there would have been prepared to
deal with any Russian movement. One
of the many defects of Port Arthur was the fact that it was so deeply
embayed; the Japanese, operating from their bases on the Straits of
Korea, could with ease intercept a relief force or reinforcements
approaching from Europe.
On February 8th 1904, a military council was held in
St. Petersburg, in which the risk of a Japanese attack on the Russian
Fleet was considered. The
Russian Military Attache at Tokyo had already pointed out that the
Japanese ultimatum meant war, and that operations were to be expected
immediately. After the
council the Czar telegraphed to Alexeieff instructions that the Japanese
were to be allowed to open hostilities, as it was not desirable that
Russia should attack. If
they landed troops in Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude, the
Russians were to offer non-opposition, provided the Japanese did not
attack. If they came north of 38 degrees the Russians were to attack
without waiting for the Japanese to fire first.
These instructions, given much too late, directed a purely
passive attitude. But they
did not completely tie Alexeieff’s hands.
The least he ought to have done was to order the extremist
vigilance on the part of the fleet. Though
present himself in Port Arthur, and therefore aware of the Sanger, he
only ordered the military garrison to be on the watch, and would not
allow Stark to take precautions against a sudden attack.
Stark on his part yielded without a struggle to Alexeieff and
issued a most dangerous order to the VARIAG and KORIETZ at Chemulpo,
telling them on no account to leave that port without further
instructions-which never reached them.
He asked Alexeieff for permission to put his fleet in condition
to meet an attack, and was told that this was “premature.” A strong admiral would have acted without asking.
On February 8th, however, he appears to have made the
signal “Prepare to repel torpedo attacks.”
This was taken in some of the ships as a mere manoeuvre; torpedo
nets, carried at that date by all large ships, were not got out, nor
were the heavy guns loaded. Two
ships were told off for searchlight duty, and two destroyers were
ordered to steam twenty miles to sea, scout, and if they observed
anything suspicious, return and report to the admiral.
Nothing could have been better calculated to assist an alert
assailant.
In single line ahead, squadron after squadron at
considerable intervals, the Japanese Fleet steamed out from Sasebo
amidst extraordinary enthusiasm, and concentrated in the afternoon of
February 7th at a rendezvous off the southwest of Korea.
Rear Admiral Uriu was there detached with the 4th
division, reinforced by the powerful armoured cruiser Asama and the 9th
and 14th torpedo Boat Division, to deal with the Russian
ships at Chemulpo and cover the three transports, which were to land
their troops. He was thus given overwhelming strength against the VARIAG
and KORIETZ, a wise proceeding, as this was to be the first engagement
between modern Japan and a white adversary.
On the way to Chemulpo the Takachiho rammed a huge whale, which
was taken by all as an omen of victory.
Soon after daybreak of February 8th, Uriu was off the
archipelago west of Chemulpo and there the Chiyoda met him.
She had been in Chemulpo watching the Russians till the previous
night, when with all possible circumspection she weighed and put to sea
with the report that they were still in the harbour.
The Chiyoda and Takachiho were sent forward by Uriu in advance,
with the 9th torpedo Division to cover the landing of troops,
which was to take place immediately.
Behind came the Asama and the other vessels.
At about 4.30 p.m. as the Japanese vessels entered the long
inlet, they saw the KORIETZ coming out, on her way to Port Arthur with
despatches. She attempted
to pass to port of the two leading Japanese cruisers, but observing that
they kept their guns trained on her and that the torpedo boats were
ready to attack, she turned to go back to her moorings but not before
the torpedo boats had fired two torpedoes at her, to which she replied
without effect from one of her guns at 4.40 p.m. of February 8th.
The Japanese did not further molest her.
They sent in their transports covered by the Chiyoda, Takachiho
and the 9th Torpedo Boat Division.
The Asama, clear for action, lay near the Russian ships, but well
outside torpedo range.
During the night the Japanese troops disembarked and left by rail
to seize Seoul. The Russian
warships looked on, paralysed by the order not to attack or oppose a
landing south of 38 degrees, and at 6 a.m. of February 9th
the Japanese warships and transports left the harbour, only the Chiyoda
remaining till 9 a.m. to deliver certain important letters from Uriu.
The first, addressed to the commanders of the neutral warships
present, informed them that war had begun between Russia and Japan,
asked them to move their vessels to a safer position, and stated that
the Russian ships would be attacked if they did not leave by noon.
The senior neutral officer, Captain L. Bayly, of the British
Talbot, dies not seem to have understood the political position or the
real situation in Korea, as he forwarded a protest to Uriu against the
proposed violation of Korean neutrality.
With this protest, Commander E. B. Barry, of the United States
gunboat Vicksburg, refused to have anything to do.
The failure of the British Admiralty, probably because of the
want of a staff, to orienate its commanders as to their duties towards
the British Ally, Japan, was the cause of their error of judgement on
Captain Bayly’s part. Uriu paid no attention to the protest. The second letter was sent by the Japanese consul to Captain
Rudneff of the VARIAG, and told him that if he did not come out he would
be attacked.
Rudneff, who was a gallant officer, had been placed in a hopeless
position by the errors of his superiors.
He decided to go out, though the VARIAG’S speed, owing to the
state of her boilers, was only 14 knots, and there was no chance of
escape. The KORIETZ’S
commander also decided to leave the port, and about noon he weighed and
stood towards the Japanese squadron, which lay some distance of the
harbour in line. The Asama
was easternmost; with in order from east to west astern of her the
Chiyoda, Naniwa, Niitaka, Takachiho and Akashi.
Three torpedo boats of the 14th Division were to
leeward of the Japanese cruisers.
The VARIAG follows the KORIETZ and soon outstripped that small
vessel which, in the approaching action, did little more than
demonstrate by firing several rounds from her old guns quite
ineffectively. On the
Japanese side the Asama did most of the fighting, attacking the VARIAG,
while the Chiyoda fired at the KORIETZ, and the other Japanese vessels
from time to time joined in, when their guns would bear.
The Asama’s crew had all the confidence which good armour
protection gives. The
Russian ships had no protection other than gun shields, and the
VARIAG’S armoured deck. In
broadside power the Russians were at a signal disadvantage against the
Asama alone:
|
|
8-in
|
6-in
|
12-pdr
|
Weight
of Metal
|
Casualties
|
|
Russian
Ships
|
1
|
7
|
6
|
922lb
|
222
|
|
Asama
|
4
|
7
|
6
|
1772lb
|
0
|
The Russian 8-inch gun in the KORIETZ was of such ancient types
and such range that it was of no value.
At 12.20 (Japanese time) p.m. of February 9th the
Asama opened fire with her 8-inch guns at 7,700 yards, bringing her
broadside to bear, and began to hit with the third shot which shattered
the VARIAG’S upper bridge, set the charthouse on fire, and killed a
junior officer and four seamen. Both
Russian ships replied but the KORIETZ speedily stopped her fire as her
shells fell short, and returned to the harbour.
The VARIAG’S shooting was poor and her projectiles uniformly
missed the Asama. The Japanese fire grew in precision as the ships slightly
closed, and clouds of smoke rose from the VARIAG.
After about fifteen minutes of firing, during which the Asaja had
not been struck once, thus verifying the principle that a deadly fire on
the enemy is the best possible protection for a crew, she had destroyed
the fighting capacity of the VARIAG.
Five 6-inch and nine smaller guns in this ship were put out of
action; both range finding stations were wrecked; the leads of the
steering engine were shot away; and a shell bursting near the foremast
wounded Captain Rudneff, killed 2 men at his side, and wounded many
others; another shell put two more 6-inch guns near the conning tower
out of action. The VARIAG
had to be steered with her engines.
She was enveloped in steam and smoke and the other Japanese
cruisers were now firing at her as the range had dropped, so that a
veritable storm of projectiles splashed about her.
To escape this punishment and put out the fires, Captain Rudneff
attempted to reach shelter behind Todolmi Island, which rises over 200
feet from the water. Owing
to the breakdown of his steering gear he all but ran his ship aground,
and had to go astern with his engines, while the Japanese were coming up
behind him. At this moment
a heavy shell on the port side hit the VARIAG, two feet above the
waterline. The hole was a
large one and through it water poured, filling one of the stokeholds and
giving the VARIAG a marked list to port.
In danger of sinking she made for Chemulpo harbour, with the
Asama following her and firing at her, but at 1.15 p.m. from risk of
hitting the neutral ships which were in line with the Russian cruiser,
the Asama suspended her fire and her pursuit, and anchored and waited
till 4 p.m. to complete her work.
The VARIAG and KORIETZ both anchored off Chemulpo, the KORIETZ
untouched by the Japanese fire and without any casualties.
The VARIAG was much shattered.
Ten of her twelve 6-inch guns, all her 12-pounders, and all her
3-pounders were out of action, though it does not appear that all had
been disabled by the Japanese fire.
Below the waterline or on it she had four bad hits.
Her upper works and ventilators were riddled, and her men put out
at least four serious fires. Of
her crew with a nominal strength of 580, 31 were killed, 91 severely,
and over 100 slightly wounded, giving a total loss in excess of 222.
Yet the actual number of hits, when the vessel was afterwards
carefully examined, proved to be only three 8-inch and eight 6-inch or
4.7-inch in addition to very numerous hits from fragments of shells,
which burst on striking the water and caused her considerable loss.
The deadlines of fire with high explosive projectiles against a
protected cruiser were thus illustrated.
The Japanese fired twenty-eight 8-inch and 248 6-inch and
4.7-inch shells, so that their percentage of hits with the 8-inch weapon
was a little fewer than eleven, and with the smaller guns slightly over
three. The good percentage
of hits with the heavy 8-inch gun was in accord with United States
experience at Manila and Santiago. The VARIAG fired 425 6-inch, 470 12-pounder and 210 3-pounder
shells, and made no hits at all, an astoundingly bad performance.
The KORIETZ fired forty-nine rounds from the heavy guns (8-inch
and 6-inch) also without a hit. It should be noted that this action was one in which a vessel
of inferior class was overpowered by one of the superior class and in
this respect it resembled Sinope, Santiago and the Falklands.
Both the VARIAG and the KORIETZ were sunk by their crews after
the action to avoid another Japanese attack.
The VARIAG’S crew was transferred to neutral ships and
subsequently interned or sent back to Russia on giving parole, but the
Vicksburg declined to take any part in thus removing combatants from the
reach of the Japanese. A Russian steamer in the port, the SUNGARI, was also sunk to
prevent her from falling into the hands of the Japanese.
The Russians fought gallantry and it was not Captain Rudneff’s
fault that he was so disastrously inferior in force.
The folly of making weak detachments and leaving them unsupported
when relations are critical was the lesson of this encounter.
The Japanese did their work well and quickly; they made no
mistakes, and were above all wise in taking care to have an enormous
superiority for the first engagement of the war.
The VARIAG was refloated in 1905 and was subsequently
reconstructed and added to the Japanese Navy.
That same morning events of immense importance had taken place at
Port Arthur. In the evening
of February 8th the Russian Fleet was at anchor outside that
harbour in three lines running from east to west, the inmost of five
battleships, the middle line headed by the TZESAREVITCH and RETVISAN
battleships, followed by three cruisers to the west; the outer line of
four cruisers headed by the PALLADA which was easternmost.
Most of the destroyers were in the harbour; of the ships outside
some were coaling. The
powerful batteries ashore were quite unready for action; the guns were
coated with grease for the winter and the recoil cylinders of the five
45-calibre 10-inch weapons on electric cliff, the best guns in the
defences, were not filled. The
destroyers RAZTOROPNY and BEZSTRASHNY were scouting seawards; otherwise,
as the result of Starks feebleness and Admiral Alexeieff’s fatuous
orders, both fleet and fortress were ill prepared to meet attack.
Togo, after detaching Uriu to deal with the VARIAG, led his main
force, consisting of the six battleships, five armoured cruisers, four
fast protected cruisers, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
4th and 5th Destroyer Divisions towards Port
Arthur, capturing on the way the Russian steamer ARGUN.
To guard the Straits of Korea a force of old ships and torpedo
craft was left under Vice Admiral Katoaka, whose command was independent
of Togo. The destroyer Akebono on the run west collided with an
auxiliary vessel, and sustained enough damage to prevent her from taking
part in the intended attack on the Russian fleet.
In accordance with orders, which had previously been drawn up,
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Destroyer
Divisions, now only ten boats strong, proceeded towards Port Arthur.
The other two divisions headed for Dalny to attack the warships,
which were supposed to be there. The
Japanese had received information from Chefoo on February 5th
that three of the Russian ships had proceeded to an unknown destination,
but a later report threw doubt on this.
In actual fact there were no Russian warships at Dalny, and the
force sent to that point was wasted.
But that could not be known beforehand; it was a reasonable
supposition that some part of the Russian Fleet would be at Dalny, and a
sound plan of action had to calculate on this.
At 10.30 p.m. (Japanese time) the glare of Russian searchlights
at Port Arthur could be seen and twenty minutes later two vessels were
sighted. They were two
Russian destroyers, which saw the Japanese and at first took them for
Russian boats. When the
mistake was detected, the Russians, in consequence of their orders, did
not venture to open fire. The
Japanese turned away from them and extinguished the screened lights
astern, which were carried for station keeping.
It was a very dark and cloudy night and the attacking flotillas
at this point fell into some disorder.
The Oboro ran into the Ikadzuchi and damaged her own bow so much
that she lost her speed and had to drop out of the formation, while the
Inadzuma in the same division lost contact with her leader.
The 3rd Division got out of touch with the other
boats, so that the destroyers available, which they had now fallen to
nine in number, delivered their attacks separately and disjointedly.
At 11.08 p.m. the 1st Division could make out the
Russian Fleet and saw that its searchlights were working.
The Japanese slowed and waited.
At 12.20 a.m. of the 9th, as the searchlights now
showed only intermittently and the moon had not yet risen, the 1st
Division attacked, turning to port and running from east to west along
the Russian line, while each of the four boats fired two torpedoes, and
then turned away and disappeared in the darkness.
Only when the first torpedoes had been fired at 12.28 a.m. and
were exploding were the Russians certain that the destroyers were
hostile; they had been mistaken by the ships at first for the two
Russian boats which were cruising outside the anchorage, and not till
then did the searchlights come on.
Of the eight torpedoes discharged the Japanese saw three explode
on striking ships. The
range appears to have been rather above than less than 800 yards, though
the Japanese intention was to close 500.
Immediately after the 1st Division came the attack of
the 2nd, which had shrunk to a single boat, the Ikadzuchi.
She fired one torpedo and turned to the south.
The Russian fire had become violent, but all the projectiles from
the ships passed over the Japanese boats.
The 3rd division, seeing the glare of searchlights and
the flash of guns, steamed towards the scene of action and was joined by
the Inadzuma, which had lost contact with her own 2nd
Division and took the place of the Sazanami in the 3rd.
The latter boat had missed herm Division in the confusion and
darkness. The three
destroyers of the 3rd Division passed along the Russian outer
line from east to west and fired six torpedoes before turning away.
Their attack was over at 12.45 a.m.
Some time later when the other boats had vanished, came the
Sazanami by herself, and at 1.25 a.m. fired two more torpedoes into the
Russian Fleet. Last of all,
quite isolated, the damaged Oboro reached Port Arthur at 1.45 a.m. fired
one torpedo at the BAYAN, and returned untouched.
Astonishing as it may sound, the Japanese boats, which took part
in the most daring attack, sustained no loss or damage whatever.
But because their attacks were not delivered simultaneously, they
lost greatly in effectiveness. Most of the Russian officers agree that had the whole
Japanese destroyer force assailed the Russian Fleet in one body, the
fleet would have suffered a great disaster.
Possibly the reason why the Japanese did not plan such an attack
with the nineteen destroyers, which they could have employed, was that
their previous experience in manoeuvres and exercises had shown that,
with a large number of destroyers, confusion and collisions in the
flotillas were to be feared. A
very high degree of training and seamanship would be required to handle
such a mass of small fast craft, but the fact remains that the Japanese
were well-trained and thorough seamen.
They had a great chance; never was a torpedo attack delivered in
such favourable conditions; but the opportunity was not utilised so
completely as might have been expected in view of the immense importance
of a signal success.
Yet the actual results obtained were serious enough for the
Russians. Torpedoes on the
port side struck the cruisers PALLADA and the battleships TZESAREVITCH
and RETVISAN. The
PALLADA’S wound was amidships, abreast of a coalbunker, and though
extensive did not endanger the ship.
The RETVISAN’S hit was forward and tore a great hole, which
measured 220 square feet. The
TZESAREVITCH was hit aft, flooding her steering compartment and
shattering her armour deck, but though the explosion was abreast of a
magazine, the charges in the magazine were not detonated. The damaged ships forthwith attempted to enter the harbour,
when the RETVISAN and TZESAREVITCH grounded at the entrance, barring the
passage for large ships, and could not be got off.
The PALLADA grounded on the west side of the entrance.
Meanwhile the Russian cruiser NOVIK had got up steam and stood
out to sea in pursuit of the Japanese destroyers.
She saw nothing of them and quickly returned.
The Japanese had thus with eighteen torpedoes made three hits and
had temporarily damaged and put out of action three ships.
The injury inflicted by the torpedoes was much less than might
have been expected, but the Japanese were distinctly unlucky. They were not probably blinded by the glare of the
searchlights and almost certainly they underestimated the distance when
they fired, and thus they failed to make the attack a decisive one.
It was speedily proved that a ship damaged near a harbour can
nearly always be repaired; and the Japanese belief at the time that the
three Russian ships hit were permanently out of action was not verified
by events. The Russian
casualties as reported by Alexeieff were 2 killed, 29 drowned, and 8
severely wounded. But the
moral effect of the onslaught on the Russian Fleet was grave.
Confidence had vanished; officers and men knew that by gross
mismanagement and neglect of precaution on the part of Alexeieff and
Stark they had been completely surprised.
Such was the depression that, according to Alexeieff and other
Russian naval officers, had the Japanese at daylight attacked in real
earnest and had it been possible for them to land a division, Port
Arthur would have fallen.
The Japanese destroyers returned to their base on the Korean
coast without informing Togo of the exact result of their attack, so far
as they could ascertain it. In
the light of events this was a mistake.
One of the good Japanese cruisers with powerful wireless could
have kept touch with the flotilla and transmitted the information it
brought to the Japanese commander.
The impression among the Japanese torpedo officers was that the
confusion and disorder in the Russian Fleet were extreme, so that
everything was to be gained by a bold, determined attack on the part of
the Japanese armoured ships, when they arrived.
No time ought to have been lost; the swifter the attack the
greater the prospect of decisive results.
Before daylight arrived Togo sent on the fast cruiser division
under Dewa to be off Port Arthur and reconnoitre it at 8 a.m. and
himself steamed towards Encounter Rock, twenty-one miles southeast of
Port Arthur, with the six battleships and five armoured cruisers.
Dewa approached close to the anchorage of Port Arthur without
being fired on, and made out three ships with heavy list lying close to
the entrance. His
appearance gave the batteries and ships warning that a fresh onset was
impending, and about this time the heavy guns at electric cliff were got
ready for action. Had the
Japanese observed Nelson’s motto, “lose not an hour,”, Togo’s
fleet might have closed before these powerful long range weapons could
have been fired.
Dewa reported with admirable judgment: “The greater part of the
enemy’s fleet is in the anchorage; I have closed to 7,700 yards,
without any firing. Several
enemy ships seem to have been damaged by our torpedoes.
I hold it would be advantageous to attack the enemy.”
About the same time one of his fast cruisers seized the Russian
steamer MONGOLIA, which, in apparent ignorance that war had begun, was
nearing Port Arthur.
At 11 a.m. of February 9th (Japanese time) Togo
increased speed and led his fleet to Port Arthur, signalling that he
intended to attack the enemy’s main fleet.
Three hours of daylight had, however, been lost; during those
three hours the Russian Admiral Stark was ashore, conferring with
Alexeieff, and an early attack would have found the Russians without
their commander-in-chief. But
when the Russian cruisers reported that the Japanese main force was
approaching, the Russian Chief of Staff on his own responsibility very
wisely ordered the fleet to weigh and form single line ahead.
The three damaged vessels were still aground near the entrance
and it was impossible for any of the Russian battleships to get past
them, so that no course remained except to fight under shelter of the
batteries. The Russians
were still in considerable disorder of the batteries.
The Russians were still in considerable disorder when the
Japanese heavy ships sighted them.
There was a slight mist veiling the coast, but the wind was light
and the sea smooth. Togo
took his place on the Mikasa’s fore bridge; the Japanese ships hoisted
their great battle-flags; and the signal went up: “The issue of
victory or defeat depends on this first battle; let every man do his
duty.” He led his eleven
ships in single line ahead towards the Russians, and at 11.55 a.m. at a
distance of over 9,000 yards the fore-turret of his ship fired the first
shot with a 12-inch gun. As
the note of the gun rang out the Russian ships and batteries opened.
Steaming past the Russians from east to west, Togo’s ships
delivered a slow, carefully directed fire on the hostile fleet.
Range diminished somewhat so that the 6-inch guns and 12-pounders
came into action. The Asahi
fired at the PERESVIET; the Fuji and Yashima made the BAYAN their
target; the other Japanese battleships fired chiefly at Russian
battleships. As the Japanese ships came in line with the southern
promontory of the Kwangtung peninsula they turned to port, southwards,
the protected cruisers under Dewa keeping out of dangerous range from
the forts, but shelling the Russian Fleet with their powerful quick
firer batteries. Of the
Russian ships only three showed any inclination to come out.
They were the BAYAN, ASKOLD and NOVIK, and the BAYAN and ASKOLD
did not move far. The NOVIK
on the contrary steamed boldly towards the Japanese, closed to about
3,500 yards and fired a torpedo, which missed.
The defilade of the Japanese Fleet past the Russian ships was
over in about fifty minutes, when the Japanese passed out of range and
both sides ceased fire. The
Japanese sustained a number of hits from heavy projectiles, most of them
apparently from the long-range guns of electric cliff.
At 12.11 a Russian 10-inch shell struck the Mikasa and exploded
just under the mainmast, wounding seven officers and men on the after
bridge. Another brought
down the great Japanese battle flag, and when the flag was hoisted
again, a third shot tore off a large part of it.
The Fuji was struck on the forward bridge by a shell from the
batteries which killed her gunnery officer and wounded 4 men, and then
exploded in the fore funnel which it shattered, killing another officer
and wounding 5 men. A
12-pounder projectile entered the after conning tower and rebounding
from its armour wounded an officer and destroyed the wireless apparatus.
The Hatsuse was twice hit and lost 7 killed and 9 wounded.
The Shikishima was struck by a 6-inch shell, which exploded in
her forward funnel and wounded 17 officers and men.
The Adzuma had her battle flag shot away; the Iwate was hit in
her stern battery and had 10 wounded.
The Yakumo was struck near her forward range finder and an
officer at it was wounded. Of
the protected cruisers, splinters from a Russian 12-inch shell, which
exploded as it touched the water short of her and did her some slight
damage, struck the Takasago. The
total loss returned by the Japanese ships was 53.
The Asahi and Yashima had no hits at all to record, among the
armoured ships. The damage
done was quite insignificant and did not in any respect affect the
fighting qualities of the ships.
In the Russian Fleet the loss was heavier and the injuries
severer, but none of Stark’s battleships or cruisers were put out of
action. The NOVIK suffered
the most; the powerful Japanese armoured cruiser Yakumo that hit her
amidships with an 8-inch shell attacked her, and she was also subjected
to a heavy fire from other of the Japanese armoured ships.
That she escaped destruction is not a little surprising. The Iwate and Tokiwa attacked the ASKOLD; the BAYAN was fired
at by most of the Japanese vessels and had fifteen hits; and the DIANA
was a good deal knocked about. All
had been hit on or below the waterline.
The POBIEDA was hit fifteen times, but for the most part on her
armour, which was not perforated. The
PERESVIET had three hits. The PETROPAVLOSK was hit on her plating
abreast of her fore funnel, and the POLTAVA was struck on the bow. The
Russian casualties were 21 killed and 101 wounded in the ships and 1
killed and 4 wounded I the forts, while a few civilians were wounded in
the town.
A close and determined attack delivered by such gunners and such
seamen as the Japanese, who could and did face severe losses unshaken,
would certainly have annihilated the Russian Fleet and ended the naval
war by one triumphant stroke, had the attack been begun at daybreak.
The one effective battery, of five 10-inch guns on electric
cliff, would then have been unable to fire and the Old Russian 11-inch
howitzers were not bettered prepared.
“The boldest measures are the safest,” Nelson had said.
Togo was not, like Admiral Sampson in the war with Spain, held
back by orders from his government, forbidding him to risk his ships.
He had full authority and discretion to use them as he thought
best. His decision was
governed by the fact that the Japanese Navy had to encounter an
adversary at sea of approximately twice its own strength-for in addition
to the Russian Fleet on the spot in the Far East, there were numerous
Russian ships in Europe which might sooner or later have to be met in
battle. Togo’s plan was to defeat the Russians in detail, and to
avoid any unnecessary risk. He
would not have hesitated to challenge the Russians in battle if he had
been able to deal with them on the open sea.
But he did hesitate when he found them under the protection of
land batteries, which, from all the information at his disposal, would
be extremely formidable.
In the light of after knowledge and later events, if the Japanese
had felt strong enough to attack, an easy victory awaited them, and they
would have been saved stupendous efforts and fearful sacrifices.
The Hatsuse and Yashima would not have been lost; the long and
terrible drama of the assaults on Port Arthur and 203-Metre Hill with
their grievous bloodshed would have been averted; and Nogi’s army
would have been available at the battle of Liaoyang.
But throughout the war Togo had to employ his fleet with an eye
to an ulterior object of the first importance, covering the
disembarkation and communications of the Japanese Army.
And though history shows that the ideal way of securing such an
object is by destroying as quickly as possible the organised force of
the enemy, in actual operations the ideal plan has often to be
sacrificed in view of practical difficulties.
Immediately after the surprise at Port Arthur the Russian
Government did what it ought to have done before the war-it appointed
its ablest officer-Vice Admiral Makaroff-to command in the Far East.
He could not arrive till March 8th, and he brought
with him a number of skilled naval constructors and artisans. Meantime on February 9th the NOVIK was docked for
repairs, and both the PALLADA and TZESAREVITCH were towed off the shoals
and taken into the harbour. The
RETVISAN was still aground but it was possible to get past her, if with
difficulty. The rest of the
Russian Fleet remained outside and its cruisers and destroyers scouted
to some distance.
On February 11th the Russian mine layer YENISEI struck
